Agents inherit human authority
Broad integration credentials give automation access it was never explicitly granted.
Use case / AI Governance
AI's access to data needs the same governance as your employees. Enforce what files your AI agents can access, what they can do, when they can do it, and whether or not the action needs human approval first.
A consequential action is evaluated before the file moves.
The operating reality
Broad integration credentials give automation access it was never explicitly granted.
A mistaken instruction or tool call can move data before a person sees the decision.
Human and agent events collapse into one identity when incident response needs the opposite.
What changes with Stellarbridge
Identity
Every agent receives its own owner, Credentials, and policy bindings instead of borrowing a user account, so AI access governance stays attributable.
Authority
Grant named actions against named resources. Sensitive operations, including external data movement, can require a human decision before execution.
Audit
The record captures actor, requested action, resource, policy outcome, and any human approval in one trail.
Control plane
Every request resolves to an attributable identity, an explicit policy decision, and a durable record.
Every agent maps to an accountable person or team.
Automation uses its own scoped identity.
Policy resolves each requested operation explicitly.
Agent behavior remains separable from human activity.
From our field notes
The SearchLeak lesson for identity, authority, and data boundaries.
Read article 02Tool access turns agent architecture into data-movement architecture.
Read article 03What changes when autonomous systems become part of the attack chain.
Read articleQuestions
Yes. The agent has a distinct credential and audit identity while retaining an accountable human or team owner.
Yes. Policies can require approval for operations such as external sharing while allowing lower-risk actions like metadata reads.
Yes. Agent and human events remain separate, including requested actions, decisions, and approval history.
Give each agent its own limited identity and allow only the files and actions that job needs. Stellarbridge checks every request against that policy before the file moves, so a person's broad login is not reused as open permission for the agent. Sensitive operations such as external sharing can require human approval (human-in-the-loop) first, and the audit trail keeps agent activity separate from people.
An agent's high-level access should be narrower than the human who owns it, not the same. Stellarbridge limits each agent to specific files and specific actions, and can require human approval for high-risk moves. That keeps powerful automation trackable without handing it a user's full access.
Treat them as their own automation accounts with a named human or team owner, not as shared user logins and not as invisible add-ons to a person. Stellarbridge gives each agent its own login and rules so identity systems and audit logs stay clear about who or what acted. Generic service accounts without file-level rules still make it hard to tell what the agent did.
Don't give agents blanket access to secrets or regulated files, and check policy before an agent reads, shares, or transfers anything. Stellarbridge limits which files an agent can open and can require approval before anything leaves your company. Blocked attempts are logged too, so security can see what an agent tried, not just what it did.
Yes, at the point where the agent reaches your files. Stellarbridge checks who the agent is, which files it wants, what it's trying to do, and where the data is going, then records the result. It doesn't install software on employee devices, so use it alongside your device management and sign-in tools to make sure agents can only reach company data through Stellarbridge.
Create agent identities first and start with no access to production files until IT grants it. Stellarbridge lets IT allow specific actions on specific files, keep human approval on risky moves, and keep builder or agent activity separate from employee accounts in the audit record. That way every new builder is not an accidental superuser.
See it in your workflow
Bring the agent, its current credentials, and the files it needs. We’ll map a least-privilege path together.